Cyrus' Paradise

It is a good question to ask, how many could imitate this ideal leader if indeed any at all could. I would venture the idea that Xenophon was not necessarily attempting to write a ‘field manual’ that every military leader should follow – meaning I do not get the impression he was pushing every military leader to pursue world conquest even on a small scale. It seems he was far too pragmatic for such an idea, though we have no way of knowing and that may be exactly what he thought. Given his vast experience with rulers and military leaders this seems unlikely.

Defining or guessing his exact audience, is problematic for sure. It is fair to assume that he was writing for an audience like himself. At least it would be logical to assume that those are the people (by virtue of shared background/experience), were most likely to understand his perspective. However, it is interesting to consider that very few hippeis would have any comparable experience to his march into and out of Persia. Precious few would be able to relate, in real terms, to the challenges of a campaign distance over a few hundred miles let alone thousands of miles through scorching dessert, high mountains, and snow! In fact, based on what we know from surviving sources, Xenophon’s fellow cadre members are the only Greeks who could truly understand these challenges and difficulties. To others who read it, it must have surely seemed like a fantastic tale indeed! It may also be the case that both the Cyropaedia and Anabasis were not widely circulated until after most of these fellows were gone. But it does seem that the Anabasis was written with the intent to repudiate the claims made by Sophaentus. (Cf. Loeb Anabassi 2006, p. 7 for a full discussion of additional ancient sources.) This is a strong indicator that multiple accounts of Cyrus the Younger’s campaign were available including Xenophon’s in his own time. The intentions of the various authors involved were likely quite varied.

The importance of intelligence, its collection, and most important the application of that information cannot be understated.  Xenophon goes to considerable effort to sketch the importance of information in several of his works.  I do think that he places varied levels of importance on them depending on the situation, since that information’s respective importance can be measured more or less depending on the respective situation. 

There is also the important distinction between applying tactical intelligence on the battlefield (Pol. Strat. 1.49.2-3) and the larger ‘operational/strategic’ intelligence noted in Cyropaeida 1.5.14. At the highest levels it is absolutely essential to the long term success of a commander.  I would argue however that at the lowest levels of command, while helpful at every level, such skills are not always “required” per se.  At the ruler or commander of army – it is a requirement absolutely.  In the context of the Near East, more acutely in the dynastic succession struggles of Achaemenid Persian court – ‘political’ intelligence was essential to survival.

It is appropriate to acknowledge our lack of verifiable corroborating historical evidence in these cases.  Even if such additional sources survived, everything that is written is done so through a respective agenda that we have no way to account for.  Certainly Xenophon is known for writing with specific perspectives, not always clearly identifiable and he is notorious in several works for what must certainly be deliberate omissions, (most notably in the Hellenika).  Only complicating the task further.  Perhaps whatever those motivations were for deliberate omissions in other works, provides unknown insight into his undertaking of the Cyropaedia as a quasi-(non)-historical work?  so that he could avoid the encumbrance of being ‘absolutely historically accurate’ and convey his own idea of the perfect situations?

It is an excellent question, of course I believe the answer to be more complicated than it might appear as there are more than one ‘type’ of resource being discussed what appears to me to be layered as well as overlapping fashion.  The type of resources I am referring to are those that Xenophon discusses in Cyropaedia 1.6.5-8, the resources of the family.  If we use two young men, one born into the wealthy part of the spectrum and one born as a slave.  In this context the wealthy young man would be taught to hunt as appropriate to his rank and class, and thus he would be taught the necessary horsemanship, navigation, and tactical skills to conclude a hunt with success.  He would also be introduced with the vital aspects (what we call “combat service and support”), the supply and communication problems and solutions as appropriate – fundamental to a successful hunt.  All of these are embodied as part of the “hunt.”
On the other side the slave, may even participate at a level on the same hunt, but his experience is merely to carry this pack from here to there, without even an explanation of why.  To him there would be no context.  He may or may not be bright enough to understand that the pack he carries contains the necessary tools to repair the weapons periodically – vital to success of the hunt.   The large difference being that the wealthy young man is made involved in the entire process presumably for the purpose of learning the entire context and the slave is serving as simple labor.  He may pick it all up and come to understand but generally the lower men are meant primarily to follow orders, certainly it is above their “station” to understand the how and why.  As far as teaching the lower men to be capable of understanding the whole process especially the preparation for the hunt.
What is interesting to me about the conversation Xenophon presents in these sections, is the emphasis that he places on the difficulty in learning the entire process.  It reads to me as an idea that must be pursued in order that it can be learned well enough to be mastered – a level of competence that must be obtained for a great leader.  He implies that competence requires effort in order to be gained gain in Cyropaedia 1.6.5.  In Cyropaedia 1.6.6, he refers specifically to this idea referencing cavalry, marksmanship, naval encounters before moving on to non-battle successes.  He implies that competence in those areas is required before asking the assistance of the gods in those matters. 

Some excellent points.  I think the question I was attempting to tease out, how the cumulative effects (or experiences) in Xenophon’s own life influenced his memory of past events.  In this case, allow me to offer an obvious observation, dealing with his perception of ruling government.  Xenophon was himself exiled by the Athenian Democracy.  He also witnessed that same group of men allow the trial and subsequent execution of his teacher Socrates for nothing more than trumped up charges.  As we all know, neither of these instances were extraordinary in Classical Athens.  Contrary to the what is often claimed by modern talking heads, sadly even within our profession, Athenian ‘rash’ action tended to be the rule rather than the exception.  If you stood heroically in battle leading a phalanx or defeating an enemy the chances were that you would return home and face a trial with the probability of execution or exile as your reward.  With that context in mind, it seems only logical that Xenophon was rightly suspicious of democracy that lacked sensibility to reserve the gravest of actions for the gravest of offenses.  In many cases these trials and punishments were meted out by those citizens who for that time, were at home rather than abroad participating or even observing the actions which were claimed the offense that brought on the specific trial.Of course from what we know, this was the right of the people in the institutions, but it is easy to see how a young man, as Xenophon, in his formative years would have a keen distaste for this type of charade.  In my own experience I can empathize with the difficult position of desiring the noble conduct on the battlefield (land or sea), but also knowing that no battlefield is conducive to bringing out the best of people.  Contrary, a battlefield does more often bring out the unmitigated determination of the participants.  It is true that there are many noble annals from the battlefields, survival and victory must serve as the watchwords if there is any expectation for a side to prevail.I do not downplay the presence of what we consider atrocities and war crimes, ancient or modern, they exist on the battlefield and they always have.  For most of recorded history those things existed as simply part of war.  The reaction in Athens in Athens following the massacre on Melos does serve as a credible distinction between what was acceptable and actions which were not.  Of course Melos was not at war with Athens, and thus I think that is what elicited such a strong reaction once news spread of the incident. Taking the realities of the years immediately following Peloponnesian War, into account – it is easy to follow Xenophon’s own (probable) association putting democracy and uncontrollable emotion together as precisely what not to do. My thought is that familiarity with conflict, of the first-hand order, focuses an acute awareness that is rarely discussed.  Ironically, the Spartans (who had 2 kings) opted not to allow their decision in regards to Athens be ruled by reaction.  Likewise the “historical” Cyrus the Great after conquering an area, integrated his newly acquired subjects – to some level and degree.  Looking at Cyrus to Cambyses, is exposed for failing to totally grasp this in the Egypt episode.  Relevant considering how to or not to deal with newly acquired subjects in the immediate aftermath of victory on the battlefield.  That is precisely the point I try to bring out.

Dan, would you consider the discussion about resources at Cyropaedia 1.6.9-11 part of this dynamic?  Cyrus, although “born into well resourced circumstances,” discusses with his father Cambyses how to extract the necessary resources to support an army; does Xenophon intend to show the (relatively) poorer Greeks how it’s done?

As you may well be aware, an entire branch of literary theory (Reception theory) has grown up around this very question: how changing horizons of perception, both individual and societal, alter the response elicited by a text (in the broadest sense of the term). I once ran a simple experiment in “reader response” with a Latin class I was teaching, asking them to document their altering responses to the line “dulce et decorum est pro patria mori” over time. I was fascinated to discover precisely this sort of schism in response among those who had served, where it was noticeably absent among most who had not.

Sarah Ferrario reminds us that Anderson suggests that Thymbrara is a solution to the tactical problem of Leuctra (a deeper enemy line which tries to break through) as well as that of Cunaxa (a longer enemy line which tries to encircle).  This would put the date of composition after 371.  See J. K. Anderson 1970.

Just one more general comment: I also think this is an important question.  Xenophon’s ideal leader seems to be the king-general, like Agis, Agesilaus, Clearchus (in his days as warlord of Byzantium and then as warlord of a wandering army in European Thrace), or Cyrus the Younger.  But how many of his readers could imitate this?  I usually get the impression that his audience was men like himself, Greek hippeis with martial inclinations, and not many of them could expect to end up in charge of a whole army.  So why does he keep coming back to the independent civil and military leader in his works?

One thing that intrigues, or frustrates, me about Xenophon is that there is so much agreement between different works.  Aside from controversial passages like Constitution of the Lacedaemonians 14 or Cyropaedia 8.8, he is usually pretty consistent with some ‘spin’ depending on context.  He lived through so many upheavals, and seems to have lived so long, that one would certainly expect his views to change over time.  So the question of what he wrote when is quite interesting to me, although I’m not sure where to start looking.  I think that Cyropaedia 8.8 is often seen to refer to the Great Satraps’ Revolt of 362/361 (but if its by Xenophon, could it be a late addition?).